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Cake day: July 29th, 2023

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  • because there’s no economic incentive to hire them to do that kind of work.

    isn’t that the old “basic science is boring and unsexy” issue though? There are economic incentives, but not in a short term-big-bux sort of way, so capitalism can’t be trusted with it.

    To conjure up a recent example, something like “The number of curves of genus two with elliptic differentials”, published back in 1997, probably had limited commercial value at the time, but 20 years later completely sunk a promising post-quantum cryptography algorithm (“An efficient key recovery attack on SIDH”) which might have had some non-trivial commercial implications if SIKE had got through the key exchange algorithm competition.

    Anyway, the Erdős problems are good candidates for llm work because they have been specified in a careful and formal way, which requires a reasonably competent mathematician to do. That then opens up mathematics to the same deskilling problem that other sectors afflicted with llms have, and because capitalism is shortsighted and stupid we don’t know what the future economic impact of that will be, right?













  • the possibility of such power falling into government hands is one that all-but guarantees Nineteen Eighty-Four levels of mass surveillance and invasion of privacy if it comes to pass

    Dealing with an implementation of Grover’s algorithm just means that you need to double the key length of your symmetric ciphers (because it only provides a root-2 speed up over brute force search). Given that the current recommended key length for eg. AES is 128 bits and we have off-the-shelf implementations that can already handle 256 bit keys, this isn’t really a serious problem.

    A working implementation of Shor’s algorithm would be significantly more problematic, but we’ve already had plenty of work done on post-quantum cryptography, eg. NISTPQC which has given us some standards, and there are even ML-KEM implementations in the wild.

    Even for the paranoid sort who might think that NIST approving a load of new cryptographic algorithms is not because quantum computers are a risk, but because the NSA has already backdoored them, there are things like X-Wing and PQXDH (used in signal) that combine conventional cryptography like ed25519 with ML-KEM, such that even if ML-KEM turn out to be backdoored or vulnerable to a new attack the tried-and-tested elliptic curve algorithm will still have done its job and your communications should remain secure, and if ML-KEM remains effective then your communications will remain secure even if a working quantum computer can implement shor’s algorithm for large enough numbers.

    Honestly though, if a state-level actor wants access to your encrypted secrets, they’ve got plenty of mechanisms to let them do that and don’t need a quantum computer to do it. The classic example might be xkcd (2009) or Mickens (2014):

    If your adversary is the Mossad, YOU’RE GONNA DIE AND THERE’S NOTHING THAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT. The Mossad is not intimidated by the fact that you employ https://. If the Mossad wants your data, they’re going to use a drone to replace your cellphone with a piece of uranium that’s shaped like a cellphone, and when you die of tumors filled with tumors, they’re going to hold a press conference and say “It wasn’t us” as they wear t-shirts that say “IT WAS DEFINITELY US,” and then they’re going to buy all of your stuff at your estate sale so that they can directly look at the photos of your vacation instead of reading your insipid emails about them.

    Quantum decryption is a little bit like the y2k problem, in that we have all the tools needed to deal with the issue well in advance of it actually happening. Except that unlike y2k it may never happen, but it is nice not to have to worry about it in either case.