If you’re on anything with a reasonably current systemd (248+, so basically any Debian 12/Fedora/Arch box), FIDO2 via systemd-cryptenroll is the one I’d reach for first, no extra daemons, actively maintained since it’s just systemd itself.

HMAC-SHA1 (yubikey-luks project) is the most battle-tested of the three, but it’s a third-party keyscript hook with spottier maintenance over the years. The SHA1 part isn’t actually a security weakness here since it’s HMAC challenge-response, not collision resistance, so don’t let the algorithm name scare you off it.

OpenPGP-on-Nitrokey is the heaviest of the three (needs gpg/scdaemon alive in initramfs), but worth it if you’re already using the OpenPGP applet for SSH auth or email signing.

I run FIDO2 with a TPM2 enrollment as fallback so a lost key doesn’t lock me out entirely.

I’d use a pair of yubikeys but that’s just because I already have them. and I say pair cuz I don’t want to rely on a single yubikey that could get lost or stolen or damaged

also I would want there to still be a password required, not just plugging in a hardware token (tho this may be implied)