We only have 5 or so decades worth of solutions to this problem. It’s probably one of the first problems to be solved for networked computers.

Innovation and new solutions are fine, but the readme for this project doesn’t mention a single other file transfer program as a comparison, which signals that they didn’t even think about existing solutions and whether they were reinventing the wheel.

A better question is “can we understand how some people believe that LLMs reason?”

I don’t trust any of these companies, but in this case I don’t think they are just using people’s data to infer the results of their study. They just did a survey:

Incogni’s researchers surveyed a representative sample of 1,000 adults to investigate people’s attitudes surrounding social media and online engagement more broadly, the extent to which they’re limiting or eliminating social media usage, their reasons for this, and what they experienced after doing so.

slop

git is distributed version control?

🌏👨‍🚀🔫👨‍🚀

Well they bought all the game studios and then closed them, so there won’t be any games to play anyway.

So the main parts that you need aside from Wireguard support in your OS, is the Tailscale client and the Headscale hosted server?

Is the client fully FOSS? Or are there still any parts of this typical deployment that could be rug-pulled if the company gets enshittified?

Fighting slop with more slop, just so it can fit back into the LLM context window to make more slop.

This is the opposite of a hash collision (where two different inputs have the same hash), it’s instead a case where the same input can produce two distinct hashes. I’m struggling to think of an actual malicious application of this.

You would need to have a malicious commit (eg. as part of a supply chain attack) which is signed by a maintainer (because their keys were stolen), and then when the project finally reverts the malicious commit, another attacker (without needing the signing keys) can recreate the malicious commit with a new commit-hash, which might trick automated tools into thinking it’s a new commit, but the tree and metadata would be identical to the malicious commit, and it would be signed using the old (stolen) signing key that would since have been revoked.

Is that their point? Or is there some other attack that this enables? This just means that we can’t blacklist git commits, since an attacker could produce a new commit hash that represents the same tree. But if an attacker already has the signing keys, then they can do this indefinitely even without this signature malleability. The signing keys would get revoked in both cases, and that’s what needs to be checked.

Yes, real people use LLMs to write blog posts. This post is slop, even if there is a real person who did some real things that inspired the text. I’ve seen enough slop at this point that the obvious tells in this article are just screaming out that they were written by an LLM.

First time seeing FIFA corruption?

I can back up my disk media. Can you back up your DRM’ed console games?

slop

cool cool cool cool cool

Just because a company says they are laying off workers due to AI, that doesn’t mean that the reason they’re being laid off is because their jobs are being replaced with AI.

And it’s no surprise that it’s the more expensive workers that are being laid off.

When you think about it, every photo we have is a photo of the Milky Way.

convincing a small company to shell out the kind of money to run something strong enough locally is something I don’t think is going to be likely, even if it’d cost less in the long run.

It’s your job to do the cost analysis. Then you present your findings and the execs decide whether to lay the up-front cost, depending on how much benefit they see it providing based on your assessment of the potential applications to the business.

I wonder if “Jonathan Beard” is even a real person.

vibe-coded